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Abstract
We investigate the role of national institutions on subnational African development in
a novel framework that accounts both for local geography and cultural-genetic traits. We
exploit the fact that the political boundaries in the eve of African independence parti-
tioned more than two hundred ethnic groups across adjacent countries subjecting similar
cultures, residing in homogeneous geographic areas, to different formal institutions. Using
both a matching-type and a spatial regression discontinuity approach we show that dif-
ferences in countrywide institutional structures across the national border do not explain
within-ethnicity differences in economic performance, as captured by satellite images of
light density. The average non-effect of national institutions on ethnic development masks
considerable heterogeneity partially driven by the diminishing role of national institutions
in areas further from the capital cities.
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1 Introduction
Few other issues have received more inquiry in the social sciences than "what are the funda-
mental determinants of comparative development?" The institutional view asserts that poorly
performing institutional structures, such as lack of constraints on the executive, poor prop-
erty rights protection, as well as inefficient legal and court systems are the ultimate causes
of underdevelopment (see Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005) for a review). Yet other
works downplay the role of formal institutions, emphasizing instead the importance of geo-
graphical features, informal cultural norms, genetic, and epidemiological traits (see Spolaore
and Wacziarg (2013) for a review).
This paper investigates the role of national institutions on comparative development in
Africa, developing a methodology that exploits in a "quasi-experimental" setting the artificial
drawing of African borders -that took place in the European capitals in the mid-late 19th
century, well before African independence and at a time when Europeans had hardly settled
in the regions whose borders were designing. The drawing of colonial boundaries partitioned
in the eve of African independence more than 200 ethnicities across two (or more) countries.
Taking advantage of this historical accident, we compare economic performance in adjacent
regions belonging to the historical homeland of the same ethnic group, but falling in different
countries and are thus subject to different formal institutions. This identification strategy
accounts both for differences in the natural environment (as the two neighboring regions have
similar geography-ecology) and for ethnic-specific cultural and anthropological traits (as people
from the same background reside at the two sides of the border).
Our identification strategy entails two major challenges. First, we need to identify in a
systematic way ethnic homelands partitioned by national borders. The second challenge derives
from the sparsity of economic performance indicators at the local (country-ethnicity) level. On
the first issue we exploit anthropological data from the pioneering work of George Peter Mur-
dock (1959), who has produced a map portraying the spatial distribution of African ethnicities
in the mid/late 19th century (Figure 1a). Projecting Murdock’s map on contemporary national
boundaries (Figure 1b), allows us to identify in a systematic manner ethnic groups that have
been split by the national borders. On the second issue, to overcome the paucity of economic
data across African regions we build on the recent contribution of Henderson, Storeygard, and
Weil (2012) and measure development at the ethnicity-country level using satellite images of
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light density which are available at a fine grid.
Ü
    Historical Boundaries of 
Ethnicities Before Colonization 
Traditional Ethnic Homelands
Figure 1a: Ethnic Boundaries
Ü
    Historical Boundaries of
Ethnicities Before Colonization
   and National Boundaries 
Traditional Ethnic Homelands
Contemporary National Boundaries
Figure 1b: Ethnic and Country Boundaries
Figures 2a−2b illustrate our approach using as example the Ambo, an ethnic group par-
titioned between Angola (a country scoring quite low in most proxies of national institutions)
in the North and Namibia (an institutionally advanced African country) in the South. In our
empirical analysis we investigate whether differences in national institutions between adjacent
countries explain differences in economic performance (as proxied by luminosity) within the
historical homeland of the same ethnic group. We perform our analysis at two levels of aggre-
gation; across partitioned ethnic areas in each country (Figure 2a) and across pixels falling in
the homeland of split groups (Figure 2b). For the Ambo luminosity is higher in Namibia, the
more institutionally developed country.
Ü
Ambo Group Partitioned Between Angola and Namibia
Light Density in 2007-2008
Mean Luminosity for Ambo's partition in Angola: 0.0504
Mean Luminosity for Ambo's partition in Namibia: 0.162
Figure 2a
Ü
Ambo Group Partitioned Between Angola and Namibia
Pixels with Zero Light Density in 07-08
Pixels with Positive Light Density in 07-08
Border Between Angola (North) and Namibia (South)
Figure 2b
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Yet, this is not the case for the Kaonde and the Anyi groups split by the Zambia - Democratic
Republic of Congo border and the Ghana - Ivory Coast border, respectively. As Figures 2c
and 2d show, a larger faction of the ethnic homeland of both groups is lit in the Democratic
Republic of Congo and in Ivory Coast, although national institutional quality is significantly
higher at the other side of the border (in Zambia and Ghana, respectively).
Ü
Anyi Group Partitioned Between
        Ivory Coast and Ghana
Pixels with Zero Light Density in 07-08
Pixels with Positive Light Density in 07-08
Border Between Ghana (East) and Ivory Coast (West)
Figure 2c
Ü
Kaonde Group Partitioned 
Between Zambia and Dem. Republic of Congo
Pixels with Zero Light Density in 07-08
Pixels with Positive Light Density in 07-08
Border Between Dem. Rep. of Congo (North) and Zambia (South)
Figure 2d
Results Summary Our analysis that spans all African partitioned ethnicities reveals
new empirical regularities. First, we document that differences in national institutions across
the border do not systematically translate into differences in economic performance within
partitioned ethnicities. While there is a significant positive correlation between national insti-
tutions and development across ethnic homelands, once we properly account for geographic-
ecological and ethnic-specific differences via the inclusion of ethnicity fixed effects, the correla-
tion weakens considerably and becomes statistically indistinguishable from zero. This pattern
obtains both when the unit of analysis is a partitioned ethnic region (see Figure 2a) and when
we take advantage of the finer structure of the luminosity data to obtain multiple observations
within each partition (see Figures 2b, c, d); moreover when we conduct a spatial regression
discontinuity (RD) analysis that identifies the (local) effect of national institutions at the bor-
der we also find a close-to-zero effect. The lack of a systematic association between national
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institutions and regional development within partitioned African homelands cautions against
extrapolating from the positive cross-country correlations.
Our results go against the conventional wisdom in economics on the causal impact of
national institutions on development, in Africa at least; yet they are consistent with the African
historiography that de-emphasizes the importance of colonial and contemporary countrywide
institutions in the hinterland (e.g., Herbst (2000), Davidson (1992)). Moreover, our findings
are in line with recent works that emphasize traits besides formal institutions, such as cultural
norms, family ties, or important historical episodes (see Algan and Cahuc (2013), Alesina and
Giuliano (2013), and Nunn (2013) for recent reviews).
Second, we show that the insignificant correlation between national institutions and
ethnic development masks considerable heterogeneity. We find that the average effect of in-
stitutions is economically negligible and statistically insignificant for approximately 60% of
partitioned ethnicities. Yet, for some groups, consisting of approximately 20% − 25% of the
sample, a significant positive association emerges, whereas for the remaining ones the within-
ethnicity association turns negative. Overall, the uncovered heterogeneity provides a useful
reminder that generalizing from the findings of case studies focusing on a single border dis-
continuity can be quite misleading. Meanwhile, it suggests that case studies may be useful for
shedding light on the specific circumstances that allow countrywide policies to shape regional
development.
Third, building on insights from the African historiography that stress the inability of
states to broadcast power in regions far from the capital (e.g., Herbst (2000), Bates (1983)),
we examine the spatial distribution of the uncovered heterogeneity. Contrary to the overall
pattern, we find that national institutions do correlate with subnational development, but only
when both partitions are close to the respective capital cities. We also present complementary
evidence on the limited penetration of national institutions expanding our analysis to the
universe of African groups; in particular, we show that the explanatory power of national
institutions on regional development decays for ethnic homelands (and pixels within groups)
further from the capital centers.
Fourth, we augment our analysis on the differential role of national institutions far from
the capital using individual-level data from the Afrobarometer Surveys on law enforcement and
self-identification (with the nation versus the ethnicity). Our within-country analysis shows
that law enforcement weakens monotonically in areas further from the capitals. Moreover,
national (as opposed to ethnic) identification is also inversely related to distance to the capital.
These results thus further illustrate the limited penetration of country-wide institutions in the
hinterland.
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Related Literature Our research nests and advances over several strands of literature
that examine the political economy of contemporary comparative development.
First, an influential body of research asserts that through persistence, the institutions
that European powers established during colonization are the deep roots of contemporary
economic performance (e.g., La Porta et al. (1997, 1998); Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002)).
Yet despite the implementation of ingenious instrumental-variable approaches employed in the
cross-country literature, omitted variables and estimate stability remain major concerns (see
Glaeser, La Porta, de Silanes, and Shleifer (2004), La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer
(2008), and Nunn (2012), among others). By exploiting within-country variation, our study
circumvents some inherent limitations of the cross-country framework;1 moreover, we move
beyond average effects and uncover the interplay between national institutions, state presence,
and proximity to the capital.
Second, our identification scheme that exploits border discontinuities in institutional
arrangements relates to works that study the role of national policies across a particular border.
In an early contribution Miguel (2004) compares public policies in health and education across
the Kenya-Tanzania border to examine the effect of Tanzanian nation-building efforts. Bubb
(2012) investigates how differences in de jure property rights between Ghana and Ivory Coast
affect development in border areas finding that in spite of large differences in formal institutions,
there are no differences in the actual enforcement of property rights. Cogneau and Moradi
(2011) examine differences in education and religiosity across the Ghana-Togo border and
link them to different colonial investments; whereas Cogneau, Mesplé-Somps, and Spielvogel
(2012) examine access to electricity, consumption, and health at the borders of Ivory Coast
with Ghana, Mali, and Burkina Faso, finding mixed evidence on the role of economic and
institutional development. Finally, Miles (1994) studies the development of the Hausa after
their partitioning (at the Niger-Nigeria border), documenting that differences between French
and British policies (mainly regarding the role of local chiefs) endured after independence and
had long-lasting effects.
Our study, rather than focusing on the role of national features across a single border
or within a single group, examines the role of national institutions on development across all
partitioned ethnicities in Africa. Thus our results are less sensitive to the usual "external
validity" arguments readily invoked in the context of case studies or works exploiting a single
discontinuity. Moreover, our expansive focus sheds light on the underlying heterogeneity and
uncovers the limited penetration of national institutions in areas far from the capital. The
1 In this regard our work is mostly related to works that exploit within-country variation on institutions, such
as Banerjee and Iyer (2005), Iyer (2010), Laeven and Woodruff (2007), De Long and Shleifer (1993), Dell (2010),
Grosjean (2011), Tabellini (2010), and Gennaioli, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2013).
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latter finding is related to parallel works of Campante and Do (2013) and Campante, Do, and
Guimaraes (2013), who link capital city isolation with misgovernance and economic efficiency.
Third, our results relate to the large literature in African political economy (see Bates
(2008) and Dowden (2008) for eloquent narratives) that stresses features beyond national in-
stitutions; these include colonial investments in education, health and infrastructure (e.g.,
Huillery (2009) and Jedwab and Moradi (2012)), ethnic partitioning (e.g., Englebert, Tarango,
and Carter (2002) and Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013a)), fractionalization (e.g., East-
erly and Levine (1997) and Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, and Wacziarg (2003)),
inequality across ethnic lines (e.g., Alesina, Michalopoulos, and Papaioannou (2013)), and
geography-health (e.g., Nunn and Puga (2012) and Alsan (2012)).
Of most relevance from this body of research is our companion paper (Michalopoulos
and Papaioannou (2013c)), where we explore the long-lasting importance of ethnic (as op-
posed to national) political/institutional traits for contemporary African development. The
main finding is that among numerous ethnic-specific features (related, for example, to the type
of subsistence economy, occupational specialization, slavery, etc.), the legacy of pre-colonial
political centralization appears to be a robust correlate of contemporary regional economic
performance (Gennaioli and Rainer (2006, 2007) provide similar cross-country evidence). In
contrast to these works that highlight the role of historical persistence at the ethnic level, in
this paper we examine the role of national institutions, which have been a dominant theme
in the growth literature and in policy circles alike. In addition, our finding that national in-
stitutions wield significant explanatory power near the capitals, which rapidly diminishes for
regions in the hinterland, highlights the importance of ethnic norms and reveals the coexis-
tence of a dual institutional framework within African countries (Lewis (1954), Migdal (1988)).
Moreover, a methodological innovation of the present study is that we identify the role of na-
tional institutions within partitioned ethnic groups taking advantage of the arbitrary drawing
of African borders and thus accounting for any (un)observable ethnic-specific differences across
the diverse African tribal landscape. This has significant advantages over works exploiting
cross-cultural variation and is motivated by the standard-textbook introduction on the role
of national institutions showing the divergence in economic performance within culturally and
geographically homogeneous entities, like North and South Korea, or East and West Germany
(see Weil (2008)).
In this regard our paper is related to subsequent work by Pinkovskiy (2013), who studies
discontinuities in satellite-recorded light density at night across the globe and links them to
country-level economic development -and its main correlates (e.g., human capital, institutional
capacity, etc.). In line with our findings, Pinkovskiy (2013) shows that borders of African na-
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tions tend to be relatively underdeveloped, with limited penetration of government activities
and substantial economic activity concentrated around capital cities.2 Moreover, our focus is
on discontinuities within partitioned ethnic homelands; as such we effectively account for both
geography-ecology and ethnic-specific features, related to history, social structure, and genetics.
In fact, the uncovered weak and insignificant correlation between national institutions and sub-
national development within geographically and culturally homogeneous territories contributes
to an emerging body of work that emphasizes the importance of cultural norms, historical per-
sistence, and human and geographic traits for comparative development (see Diamond (1997),
Landes (1998), Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2006), Spolaore andWacziarg (2009), Putterman
and Weil (2010), Ashraf and Galor (2013) and Michalopoulos, Naghavi, and Prarolo (2012),
among others).
Paper Structure In the next section we describe how we identify partitioned groups
and discuss the luminosity data that we use to proxy subnational development. In section 3 we
discuss the estimating framework and detail the identification design. In Section 4 we report the
baseline estimates on the average effect of national institutions on economic development within
partitioned ethnic homelands. We also present spatial regression discontinuity (RD) estimates
that quantify the effect of national institutions at the border. In Section 5 we estimate the role
of national institutions separately for each split group mapping the overall heterogeneity. In an
effort to understand the latter, in Section 6 we explore how proximity to the capital shapes the
explanatory power of national institutions on regional development. In section 7 we summarize
discussing avenues for future research.
2 Data
2.1 Identifying Partitioned Ethnicities
Murdock’s map (Figure 1a) portrays the spatial distribution of ethnicities across Africa in the
mid/late 19th; it depicts 826 ethnic areas inhabited upon colonization (in total there are 834
polygons, but 8 regions are classified as "uninhabited"). Intersecting the pre-colonial map
with the 2000 Digital Chart of the World (Figure 1b) that portrays contemporary national
boundaries we obtain 1, 247 country-ethnicity observations (e.g., Ambo in Angola, Ewe in
Togo, Zulu in South Africa). We classify an ethnicity as partitioned when at least 10% of
the historical homeland belongs to more than one contemporary state. We drop partitioned
areas of less than 100 square kilometers as tiny partitions are most likely due to the lack
2Note that focusing on Africa is desirable since, in contrast to African borders, in Europe and most other
parts of the world national borders have been contested by numerous wars and are the outcome of active state
formation and (in)voluntary people’s movements.
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of precision and projection error. Our procedure identifies 526 partitions that belong to the
historical homeland of 227 ethnic groups. We report estimates for 220 partitioned ethnicities
(507 country-ethnicity observations), because for six groups (the Ifora, the Kunta, the Berabish,
the Atta, the Teda, and the Asben) the local population estimates indicate zero population (in
one of the two partitioned areas); moreover, we lose information from the Imragen -which are
partitioned between Western Sahara and Mauritania- because we do not have information on
national institutions for Western Sahara.
Ü
   Ethnic Groups 
Partitioned by the
National Borders




 Light Density in 2007-2008
   Across Ethnic Partitions
National Boundaries in 2000






Appendix Table A lists partitioned ethnicities. Examples include the Ewe that have
been partitioned between Ghana and Togo (shares 44% and 56%, respectively), the Esa be-
tween Ethiopia and Somalia (shares 52% and 44%, respectively, while a small fraction falls in
Djibouti), and the Yao (Wayao) between Mozambique (65%), Malawi (13%), and Tanzania
(22%). Our procedure reveals that the median country in Africa has 43% of its population
belonging to partitioned ethnicities. This estimate is similar to that of Asiwaju (1985) and
Alesina, Easterly, and Matuszeski (2011), who using alternative sources and techniques es-
timate that on average 40% of the African population belongs to partitioned ethnic groups.
Thus our analysis, while focusing on partitioned homelands, captures a significant fraction of
the African population (Figure 3a).
Case study and anecdotal evidence suggest that in spite of population movements ethnic
populations tend to reside in their respective historical homelands. Nunn and Wantchekon
(2011) document that close to 55% of respondents in the Afrobarometer Surveys currently live in
their ethnic group’s ancestral homeland. In the same vein, Glennerster, Miguel, and Rothenberg
(2013) document in Sierra Leone that after the massive displacement of the 1991− 2002 civil
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war there has been a systematic movement of individuals towards the areas of their ethnic
group’s historical homeland.
2.2 Satellite Light Density at Night
The nature of our study requires data on economic development at the country-ethnic homeland
level. Since there are limited geocoded measures of economic development in Africa, we build
on the recent contribution of Henderson, Storeygard, and Weil (2012) and use satellite images
on light density to proxy local economic activity.
Data come from the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program’s Operational Linescan
System (DMSP-OLS) that reports time-stable images of the earth at night captured between
20 : 00 and 21 : 30. The measure ranges from 0 to 63 and is available for every 30-second
area pixel (approximately 1 square kilometer). The satellite detects lights from human settle-
ments, fires, gas flares, lightning, and the aurora. The annual composite measure is created by
overlaying all daily images captured in a year, dropping images where lights are shrouded by
cloud cover or overpowered by the aurora or solar glare (near the poles), and after removing
ephemeral lights (like fires, lightning and other noise).3 Using these data we construct light
density per square kilometer for 2007 and 2008 averaging across pixels that fall within the
historical homeland of each ethnic group in each country.
Besides its availability at a very fine geographic level, luminosity is well suited to spatial
analyses of development in Africa for some additional reasons. First, most African countries
have low quality income statistics, both at the national and the sub-national level (Jerven
(2013)). Second, we lack data on regional incomes for most African countries; and while there
are some local proxies of poverty and health, these do not map to our ethnicity level unit of
analysis.
Despite a series of works that establish a strong within-country correlation (both across
time and across regions) between light density at night and GDP in the on-line Supplementary
Appendix (Section 1) we provide further cross-validation checks of the luminosity data in our
context.4 Specifically, using individual-level data from the Afrobarometer Surveys on access
to electrification, presence of a sewage system, access to piped water, and education we show
that light density correlates strongly with these proxies of public goods and development both
3See Henderson, Storeygard, and Weil (2012) and Chen and Nordhaus (2011) for technical details on the
lights data. Satellite data on light density at night are subject to overglow/blooming; this happens because
lights tend to appear larger than they are over water and snow. While this issue is not particularly important
in our application as we do not have observations near the poles and covered with snow, in many specifications
we control for water area and distance to the coast. Another issue with the light data comes from top coding -
that usually happens in the capitals of developed countries. Yet, in Africa instances of top-coding are rare.
4See Henderson, Storeygard, and Weil (2012), Elvidge, Baugh, Kihn, Kroehl, and Davis (1997), Doll, Muller,
and Morley (2006), Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013c), and Pinkovskiy (2013), among others.
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across Afrobarometer enumeration areas within countries and within ethnic homelands as well
as across the border within partitioned ethnicities.
2.3 National Institutions
We measure national institutions using data from World Bank’s Governance Matters Database
(Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2008)). The World Bank assembles numerous de facto
institutional quality measures (originally compiled by various non-governmental organizations
and risk assessment agencies) and aggregates them into six categories via principal components
aiming to minimize measurement error. We mainly use the rule of law index that reflects the
effectiveness of the judiciary and the quality of property rights protection. As many studies on
African development focus on graft, we also report results using the control of corruption index.
Both variables range theoretically between −2.5 and +2.5 with higher values indicating better
functioning institutions and less corruption. To account for reverse causality and measurement
error, we use predetermined values of the institutional quality measures, taking the mean over
the period 1996−2006 (the results are robust to the choice of year). In our sample the countries
with the lowest rule of law are Somalia (−2.195), the Democratic Republic of Congo (−1.88),
and Liberia (−1.73) while South Africa (0.156), Namibia (0.1675), and Botswana (0.615) are
the most institutionally developed countries in Africa.
2.4 Data Patterns
There is significant variation both in national institutions and luminosity across African borders
(Figure 3b). Sharp border discontinuities in rule of law appear in several parts of Africa. For
example, in the Botswana and Zimbabwe border (where the Hiechware, the Subia, and the
Tlokwa are partitioned); across the Namibia and Angola border (where the Ambo are split);
between Kenya and Somalia (where the Bararetta and other Somali tribes reside); and between
Gabon and Congo (where the Duma live). Likewise, there are evident changes in luminosity
across the border within the homeland of the same ethnic group. On the one hand, despite
differences in national institutions, in around 25% of the sample there are negligible differences
in light density across the border. On the other hand, in about 40% there are more than one
log point differences in luminosity. For example, sizable jumps in luminosity appear in the
Egypt-Sudan border (where the Ababda and the Barabra are split), in the border between





Specification at the Country-Ethnic Homeland Level Our analysis on the re-
lationship between national institutions and regional development is based on variants of the
following specification:
yi,c = a0 + γIQLc + λ1PDi,c + λ2AREAi,c +X
′
i,cΦ+ ai + εi,c. (1)
The dependent variable, yi,c, reflects the level of economic activity in the historical
homeland of ethnic group i in country c, as proxied by light density. Since a significant fraction
(around 30%) of the (country-ethnicity) observations takes on the value of zero, we use as depen-
dent variable the log of light density adding a small number ((yi,c ≡ ln(0.01+LightDensityi,c)).
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The logarithmic transformation is useful because we use all observations and because we ac-
count for some extreme values in luminosity (outliers).
Specification at the Pixel Level We also exploit the fine structure of the luminosity
data to obtain multiple observations (pixels) within a partitioned ethnic area in each country;
we do so running the following regression equation (variant of (1)).
yp,i,c = a0 + γIQLc + λ1PDp,i,c + λ2AREAp,i,c +X
′
p,i,cΦ+ ai + ζp,i,c. (2)
The dependent variable, yp,i,c, is a dummy that takes on the value one if pixel p is lit and
zero otherwise. Each pixel, p, falls in the historical homeland of partitioned ethnicity i located
in country c (see Figures 2b − d for examples). In our analysis we use pixels of 0.125 x 0.125
decimal degrees (approximately 12.5km x 12.5km). Since there are several unpopulated pixels
(in the Sahara or in the rainforests) and to make sure that we examine the role of national
institutions on development properly, we exclude pixels with zero population.6 This results
to more than 120, 000 observations across all African ethnic homelands, with 42, 710 of those
belonging to partitioned ethnicities.
While conceptually the unit of our analysis is a partition of a group (Figure 2a), the
pixel-level specifications (Figure 2b) are useful for several reasons. First, by looking at the
extensive margin of light density we account for the non-linear nature of luminosity. Second,
the linear probability models facilitate the interpretation of the estimates. Third, we are able
5A zero level of light density occurs either because the area is extremely sparsely populated without any
electricity or because the satellite sensors cannot capture dimly lit areas. In the previous draft of the paper we
added one (rather than 0.01) to the luminosity data before taking the logarithm finding similar results.
6The coefficient estimates are similar when we also consider unpopulated pixels and/or if we construct pixels
of alternative size.
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to control for various -relevant for development- characteristics at a fine level. Fourth, it is
straightforward to augment the pixel-level specification with RD polynomials on distance to
the national border, so as to estimate the effect of national institutions at the border. Fifth, we
can estimate the pixel-level specification for each partitioned ethnicity separately and explore
potential heterogeneity on the impact of institutions on development.
Independent Variables IQLc denotes institutional quality of country c, as reflected
in the rule of law and the control of corruption measures. For split groups, each partition is
assigned to the corresponding country c. For example, regional light density in the part of the
Egba in Benin is matched to the institutional quality of Benin, while the adjacent area of the
Egba in Nigeria is assigned the value of Nigeria.
In most specifications we control for log population density, PD(p),i,c, because the as-
sociation between luminosity and economic development strengthens and because by doing so
the estimates capture the role of institutions beyond population density. We also control for
the log of land area, AREA(p),i,c; although most pixels are of the same size, those intersected
by the coast line, national and ethnic boundaries are smaller (see Figures 2b, c, d).
Vector X(p),i,c includes additional controls at the ethnic-homeland level (in (1)) or at the
pixel level (in (2)).7 The Data Appendix provides variable definitions and data sources. Table
1 reports summary statistics in the sample of partitioned ethnicities (at the country-ethnic
homeland level in Panel A and at the pixel level in Panel B).8
Inference In all specifications we employ the approach of Cameron, Gelbach, and
Miller (2011) and cluster standard errors along the country and the ethnic-family dimension.
Murdock assigns the 826 groups into 96 ethnolinguistic clusters. This double-clustering para-
meterization accounts for two main concerns related to non-adjusted standard errors. First,
within each country we have several ethnic homelands (or pixels) where the country-level rule
of law and the control-of-corruption measures take the same value and thus clustering at the
7Specifically, we control for land suitability for agriculture and average elevation. The latter has affected
African development both via goods and slave trades (see Nunn and Puga (2012)). We also control for sur-
face under water to account for blooming in the luminosity data and for the potential positive effect of water
streams on development via trade. Moreover, we control for malaria suitability since many studies document its
detrimental effect on development (see Gallup and Sachs (2001)). We also include indicators for the existence
of oil and diamonds fields to account for the "natural resource" curse (see Ross (2012)). Finally, we add a set
of controls measuring the distance from the capital city, the national border, and the coast, respectively. The
coefficient on distance from the capital may reflect the impact of colonization and the limited penetration of
national institutions due to the poor infrastructure (we formally explore this possibility below). Distance to the
border captures the potentially lower level of development in border areas. Distance to the sea coast captures
the effect of trade, but to some extent also the penetration of colonization. This is because during the colonial
era (and the slave trades) Europeans mainly settled in coastal areas.
8 In Supplementary Appendix Table 2 we report summary statistics for the full sample of African ethnic
homelands, 1, 209 country-ethnic observations and 120, 501 pixels.
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country-level is required (Moulton (1990)). Likewise, clustering at the ethnic family accounts
for intra-ethnic-family correlation in (un)observed features. Second, the multi-way clustering
method allows for arbitrary residual correlation within both dimensions and thus accounts
for spatial correlation; Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2011) explicitly cite spatial correla-
tion as an application of the multi-clustering approach (see Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) and
Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013c) for applications of the multi-way clustering method
in a similar context). We also estimated standard errors accounting for spatial correlation
of an unknown form using Conley’s (1999) GMM method. The two approaches yield similar
standard errors.
3.2 Validity of Identification Design
For our identification strategy that compares economic development at the homelands of the
same ethnicity in adjacent countries to be valid, one needs that border drawing should not have
been influenced by local circumstances and factors that themselves shape or reflect economic
well-being (see Angrist and Pischke (2008)). Moreover the ethnic areas across the border need
to be similar across all relevant for development dimensions. We have thus investigated these
issues in detail.
First, all the anecdotal evidence suggests that colonizers drew African borders in an
arbitrary manner (see Wesseling (1996), Asiwaju (1985), Herbst (2000), and Englebert (2009)
for eloquent reviews); the delineation of African borders took place in a period (late 19th
century), when Europeans had not yet settled (most of) Africa and had limited knowledge of
its political and economic geography; moreover, at that time colonizers were mostly assigning
spheres of influence via the establishment of protectorates, colonies and free-trade-areas, let
alone the borders of future African states. Consistent with the historical narratives on the
artificiality of African borders, Alesina, Easterly, and Matuszeski (2011) document that close
to 80% of African borders follow latitudinal or longitudinal lines, the highest percentage across
all continents. Moreover, Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013a) show that besides land
mass and water area, there are no systematic differences between non-split and partitioned
ethnicities, across dozens of potentially relevant for development factors, related to geography,
natural resources, the disease environment, and historical traits (capturing the intensity of
pre-colonial conflict, political centralization, the type of subsistence economy, the intensity of
the slave trades, etc.). Yet, since some borders may have been drawn taking into account
local conditions, in the Supplementary Appendix we report estimates restricting attention
to ethnicities partitioned by borders that follow relatively straight lines (as identified by the
"box-count" method of Alesina, Easterly, and Matuszeski (2011)). The results are virtually
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unchanged (see the associated discussion in the Supplementary Appendix and Appendix Tables
9A and 9B).
Second, although research shows that ethnic groups tend to occupy geographically ho-
mogenous territories (Michalopoulos (2012)), we investigated whether differences in institu-
tional quality across the border correlate with differences in various characteristics. Table 2 -
Panels A and B report ethnicity fixed effects estimates ("similarity" regressions) that associate
geographic, ecological, and natural resource measures with the rule of law and the control of
corruption index, respectively. In Panels C and D we focus on the two largest partitions of
the 220 split groups (440 observations) and examine whether there are systematic differences
between regions falling in the relatively high and the relatively low institutional quality coun-
try. The results are supportive of our identification strategy, as they point out that the two
(or more) partitions of partitioned ethnicities are appropriate counterfactuals. Differences in
geography-ecology, location, and natural resources across the border within partitioned ethnic
homelands are small and not systematically linked to differences in national institutions.9
4 Baseline Results
4.1 Preliminary Evidence. Cross-sectional Analysis.
Before we report the baseline ethnicity fixed effects estimates, we examine the cross-sectional
patterns running simple LS specifications that associate regional development with national
institutions. Due to reverse causation and omitted variables, these specifications do not identify
causal effects; yet they are useful for understanding the raw data patterns. Table 3 - Panel
A reports estimates at the country-ethnicity level (1, 209 observations), while Panel B reports
similar estimates at the pixel level (120, 501 observations). Specification (1) shows that there is
a positive and significant correlation between the rule of law index and regional development.
In column (2) we control for log population density and log land area, whereas in column (3) we
control for distance of each ethnic area (in Panel A) or each pixel (in PanelB) to the capital city,
the national border, and the coast ("location controls"). While all distance terms enter with
significant coefficients, the estimate on the rule of law index retains its economic and statistical
significance. In column (4) we augment the model with a rich set of geographic-ecological
and natural-resource controls. Conditioning on geography reduces the coefficient on national
institutions (approximately by 35%) though the estimate retains its statistical significance.10
9 In Supplementary Appendix Section 2 we report similar specifications at the pixel level and present regression
discontinuity graphs showing that there are no jumps at the border within ethnicities across numerous geographic
and location feature (Appendix Figures 4a− 4g).
10Land suitability for agriculture, which reflects climatic (temperature and precipitation) conditions, enters
most models with a positive and significant estimate. The malaria stability index enters in all specifications with
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The results are similar when we use the control of corruption index (in (5)-(8)).
The coefficient in column (4) of Panel A implies that a one-point-increase in the rule of
law index (roughly 2 standard deviations), which corresponds to moving approximately from
the institutional quality of Angola to that of Gabon, is associated with a 0.70 log points increase
in regional luminosity (approximately half a standard deviation) and an 8% higher likelihood
that a pixel is lit.
The correlations in Table 3 echo the findings of cross-country works; although the associ-
ation between institutional quality and development weakens when one accounts for geography,
it remains significant. Yet the fact that a small set of observable geographic features explains
a moderate fraction of the cross-sectional correlation between institutional quality and ethnic
development suggests that other unobserved or hard-to-measure aspects of geography-ecology
and culture may further weaken the association.
4.2 Ethnicity-Fixed-Effects Estimates
Having established that regions across the national border that are part of the historical home-
land of the same ethnicity are reasonable counterfactuals (in Table 2) and having explored the
cross-sectional patterns (in Table 3), we now examine the correlation between national insti-
tutions and luminosity within partitioned groups. Table 4 - Panel A gives the results at the
country-ethnic homeland level (equation (1)), while Panel B reports the results at the pixel
level (equation (2)). For comparability, in odd-numbered columns we report cross-sectional
estimates, while in even-numbered specifications we add ethnicity fixed effects. The cross-
sectional estimates in columns (1) and (5) suggest that border areas that belong to countries
with higher institutional quality display higher levels of development. For example, the esti-
mate of the linear probability model in column (1) implies that a one-point increase in the rule
of law index increases the likelihood that a populated pixel is lit by approximately 11%.
Yet when we solely exploit within-ethnicity variation, the coefficients on rule of law and
control of corruption drop sizably and become statistically insignificant. This is a uniform
pattern across all permutations. At the country-ethnic homeland level the estimates fall from
0.65 to 0.19 and from 0.79 to 0.26. The coefficient drop in the linear probability models is
starker; the estimate drops from 0.11 to 0.025 in the case of rule of law and from 0.14 to 0.037
in the case of the control of corruption index.11 We also investigated formally whether the
a statistically negative estimate. The coefficient on land area under water is positive and in many specifications
significant. Elevation enters with a negative estimate, which is significant in some models. The petroleum
dummy enters always with a significantly positive coefficient. The diamond dummy enters with a negative
coefficient that is significant in some permutations.
11The results are similar when we use the level of luminosity at the country-ethnic homeland level as the
dependent variable. In the analogous to columns (1) and (5) cross-sectional models the estimate (standard
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estimates on national institutions are statistically different between the cross-sectional and the
within-ethnicity models performing a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) Hausman-like test;
the latter suggests that the difference in the coefficients is statistically significant at standard
confidence levels. The insignificance of the ethnicity fixed-effects estimates is not driven by a
decrease in the precision of the coefficients, since the standard errors remain largely unchanged
(in Panel A) or even fall (in Panel B); it is the drop in the coefficient magnitude that is
substantial.
Figures 4a-4b below illustrate the lack of a systematic within-ethnicity correlation be-
tween light density and institutional quality at the national level. The insignificance is not
driven by a few (influential) observations; the within R2 of the unconditional model is tiny, less
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In Table 5 we restrict estimation to areas close to the national border focusing in columns
(1)-(2) and (5)-(6) on areas within 50 kilometers from each side of the border (total 100 kilo-
meters), while in columns (3), (4), (7), and (8) we focus on regions within 25 kilometers of each
side of the border (total 50 kilometers). The idea of this approach (which is similar in spirit to
local regressions in regression discontinuity designs) is that by focusing on areas very close to
the border, we further neutralize the role of unobservable factors. While in the cross section
there is a strong positive association between national institutions and regional development,
the within-ethnicity coefficients of rule of law and control of corruption are small and statisti-
cally indistinguishable from zero. This applies both at the country-ethnicity sample (in Panel
A) and at the pixel level (in Panel B). The lack of significance is not driven by an increase in
the standard errors; in all permutations two-standard-error bands in the within-ethnicity es-
timates exclude the analogous cross-sectional ones. The cross-sectional estimates fall by more
error) on the national institutions measures is 0.18 (0.09) and 0.215 (0.1065). Once we include ethnicity fixed
effects the estimates (standard errors) fall considerably to 0.05 (0.09) and 0.05 (0.13). See Appendix Table 6.
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than two thirds once we add ethnicity fixed effects (from 0.68 to 0.083 in (1) and from 0.86 to
0.09 in (4)). Similarly, the linear probability estimates drop from 0.10− 0.14 to 0.02, implying
tiny economic effects. The statistical and economic insignificance of the coefficient is therefore
casting doubt on the causal interpretation of the simple cross-sectional association between
national institutional quality and subnational development.12
A Note on Ethnicity Fixed Effects Across all model permutations in Tables 4− 5,
the ethnicity fixed effects are jointly significant at the 99% confidence level. Moreover, most of
the ethnicity constants are individually highly significant. This suggests that African subna-
tional development has a strong local geographic-ecological or/and ethnic-specific component.
Since our focus is on isolating the effect of national institutions from local geographic and cul-
tural traits, we do not examine in detail which aspects of the local environment the ethnicity
fixed effects capture. Yet, given the importance of this issue, in the Supplementary Appendix
(Section 3) we conduct a preliminary analysis using anthropological data from George Peter
Murdock’s Ethnographic Atlas (1967) that records various quantitative measures of cultural,
economic, and political traits for a large sample of African ethnicities. The cross-ethnicity
specifications show that simply conditioning on the degree of pre-colonial political centraliza-
tion (a key correlate of both economic and institutional development in Africa; see Gennaioli
and Rainer (2007, 2006) and Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013c)) or/and the type of
the subsistence economy (dependence on agriculture and pastoralism, in particular) weakens
considerably the cross-sectional coefficient on the national institutions proxy that becomes sta-
tistically indistinguishable from zero. These preliminary findings are in accord with recent
works on the deep origins of African development that emphasize the key role of ethnic traits,
as opposed to national features (see Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013b) for a review of
recent studies).
4.3 Regression Discontinuity (RD) Estimates
We now report the results from the regression discontinuity (RD) approach that identifies the
(average) effect of national institutions at the border.
Our RD specification within the two major partitions of each ethnic group takes the
following form:
yp,i,c = a0 + γIQL
HIGH
c + f(BDp,i,c) + λ1PDp,i,c + λ2AREAp,i,c +X
′
p,i,cΦ+ ai + ζp,i,c. (3)
12The insignificance of the coefficient on national institutions is not driven by the double clustering of the stan-
dard errors. In many specifications clustering only at the country level suffices to make the estimate statistically
indistinguishable from zero at standard confidence levels.
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The difference with specification (2) is that since we aim at identifying the effect of
national institutions on regional development at the border, we add RD-polynomials of the
distance from the centroid of each pixel to the national border (f(BDp,i,c)), allowing the coef-
ficients on the polynomial terms to be different for each side of the boundary. IQLHIGHc is a
dummy variable that takes on the value one for pixels falling in the country with the relatively
better institutions, as reflected either in the rule of law or in the control of corruption index.13
This RD-type design (see Imbens and Lemieux (2008); Lee and Lemieux (2010)) exploits the
discontinuity in the quality of national institutions at the border to identify institutions’ local
average (treatment) effect.
Previous research has employed variants of the above regression equation using different
control functions of the running variable (distance to the border in our application) and limiting
estimation close to the discontinuity using different bandwidths. Some researchers control for
high-order polynomials in the forcing/running variable using all observations (both far and
close to the discontinuity), as this approach maximizes the sample and is more efficient (e.g.,
Lee, Moretti, and Butler (2004)). Others estimate local regressions limiting their analysis to
an area close to the discontinuity either including or excluding the polynomial control function
(e.g., Dell (2010), Angrist and Lavy (2002)). For completeness, we employ all approaches and
experiment with different bandwidths.
Baseline Results Table 6 - Panel A reports the RD results that identify the effect of
national institutions on development exactly at the border. In columns (1)-(2) we use all pixels
across the two major partitions of split-by-the-border ethnic homelands, controlling flexibly
for the distance to the discontinuity using a cubic RD polynomial and a fourth-order RD
polynomial, respectively. On average the likelihood that a pixel is lit is just one percentage
point higher in the country with the relatively higher institutional quality. The coefficient on
the dummy that switches to one for ethnic regions falling in the relatively less corrupt country
is even smaller (in (7)-(12)). Specifications (3)-(6) and (9)-(12) report local-linear regression
results narrowing estimation to pixels within 50 or 25 kilometers from each side of the border
(total bandwidth 100km and 50km, respectively), while including the RD polynomial terms.
The coefficient on the high institutional quality country is close to zero (in some specifications
is negative) and statistically insignificant. In Panel B rather than including a common to all
partitioned ethnicities RD polynomial, we include ethnic-specific polynomial terms on distance
to the border (i.e., allowing for the effect of the running variable to be different for each
13 In previous drafts of the paper, we used the value of the rule of law or the control of corruption mea-
sures, rather than the high/low institutional quality transformation. The coefficients on the two proxies of
national institutions measures in these "difference-in-discontinuities" specifications were small and statistically
indistinguishable from zero.
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group). The RD estimates on the national institutions measures are small and statistically
indistinguishable from zero across all perturbations.
Graphical Illustration Figures 5a and 5b provide a visual illustration of the RD
results. The Figures plot the average likelihood that a pixel is lit for bins of 5 kilometer width,
conditioning on log pixel area and log population density in areas close to the national border
(the vertical line marks the national border). We report results using a 100 kilometer and a 50
kilometer bandwidth, respectively. The Figures also plot predicted pixel-level luminosity from a
regression that includes a third-order RD polynomial on distance to the border fitted separately
for pixels in the partitions that fall in the relatively high institutional quality country (where
distance takes on positive values) and pixels falling in the relatively low institutional quality
country (where distance takes on negative values). In line with the RD estimates in Table 6
there are no discernible differences in luminosity crossing the national boundary towards the
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Large Discontinuities In Table 7 we report RD specifications (with a third and
fourth-order polynomial in distance to the national border) as well as simple ethnicity fixed
effects estimates for the two-major partitions of groups split between countries with large, de-
fined as higher than the median or larger than the 75th percentile, differences in rule of law or
in graft. By focusing on adjacent countries exhibiting substantial differences in national insti-
tutions (e.g., Botswana-Zimbabwe, Kenya-Somalia, Ghana-Ivory Coast) we minimize concerns
that the insignificance of the estimates is due to measurement error or/and is driven by small
differences in national institutions across the border. The estimated coefficients on the two
measures of national institutions are quantitatively small (very close to zero) and statistically
insignificant across all permutations.
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4.4 Sensitivity Checks
We have performed numerous perturbations to investigate the robustness of the lack of sys-
tematic association between national institutions and regional development within partitioned
African ethnicities. We report and discuss in detail these robustness checks in the on-line Sup-
plementary Appendix (in Section 4). Specifically, we show that the results are similar when:
(1) we express luminosity in levels and estimate the specifications with either OLS or Poisson
pseudo-maximum likelihood estimator that accounts for the non-linear nature of the luminos-
ity (see Silva and Tenreyro (2006)); (2) we use the alternative institutional quality measures
from World Bank’s Governance Database; (3) we use the 2007 values of the rule of law or the
control of corruption measures; (4) we restrict estimation to ethnic homelands partitioned by
straight-line-like borders; (5) we proxy ethnic development with log population density; (6) we
account for population clustering near the border, temporary migration, and bleeding of the
lights data by excluding areas very close to the border; (7) we drop observations iteratively
from the Northern, Southern, Central, Western, or Eastern Africa, respectively; (8) we replace
ethnicity fixed effects with border fixed effects; (9) we experiment with a two-dimensional RD
polynomial on latitude and longitude (see Dell (2010)); (10) we perform our analysis in a
smaller sample of 32 partitioned ethnicities using data from the 2005 Afrobarometer household
surveys on public goods provision and education as the dependent variable.
5 Heterogeneity
Our estimates so far summarize the average effect of national institutions on development
across all split ethnicities; conducting the analysis for the universe of split groups is useful
as it accounts for idiosyncratic features both across specific borders and across ethnicities.
Moreover, studying the link between national institutions and ethnic development across all
partitioned homelands makes the estimates less prone to "external validity" concerns that
characterize case-study evidence. Nevertheless, the richness of the quasi-natural experiment of
ethnic partitioning in Africa allows us to estimate the role of national institutions separately
for each split group. Doing so will help reveal whether the weak correlation between national
institutions and subnational development within groups reflects a generalized phenomenon or
conceals considerable heterogeneity. Finding the latter will set stage for exploring the factors
that give rise to the observed pattern.
As a first step of moving beyond average effects, we repeated our estimation for groups
split within each of the main African regions (using Nunn’s (2008) classification). The results
(reproduced in Appendix Table 16) suggest that the relationship between national institutions
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and ethnic development varies across African regions. On average for (28) groups split within
countries in Southern Africa those partitions belonging to the more institutionally developed
nations are more economically developed. However, the opposite is true when we focus within
North Africa (though the number of split groups is quite small). In Eastern and Western
Africa differences in national institutions have no bearing on the within-ethnicity economic
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Perhaps more importantly, we estimate the correlation between national institutions and
pixel-level development separately for each split group. Figure 6a reports the distribution of
the unconditional estimates on the high rule of law binary index; this is similar to a simple test
of means of the likelihood that a pixel is lit on the two sides of the border. Figure 6b plots the
distribution of the estimate when we condition on log population density and log pixel area.14
(The results are similar when we include additional controls or/and RD polynomials.)
A couple of interesting patterns emerge. First, both the average and the median value
of the ethnic-specific estimates are zero; this applies both to the unconditional and to the
conditional coefficients. Moreover, the mass of the distribution is centered on zero. Not only
the coefficient is small, but for about 120 groups (62.5%) the absolute value of the t-statistic
in the conditional estimates is less than 1.60, implying statistically insignificant patterns.
Second, better national institutions translate into a significantly higher regional develop-
ment for approximately 38 cases (around 20% of the sample). The Ambo, depicted in Figure
2b, is one such example. Other examples where differences in rule of law translate into in-
creased luminosity include the Thonga (split by the border of South Africa and Mozambique),
14The histogram plots 190 ethnic-specific coefficients. This is because for 30 ethnicities, all pixels on both sides
of the border are unlit (hence the role of national institutions cannot be estimated). Examples of ethnicities
with zero luminosity on both sides of the border include the Mundu (split by the Sudan-Zaire border), the Koma
and the Suro (split by the Ethiopian-Sudan border), and the Karamojong (split between Kenya and Uganda).
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the Seke (split between Gabon and Equatorial Guinea), and the Tukulor (split by the Senegal-
Mauritania border).
Third, in approximately 30 − 34 cases the coefficient for the high institutional quality
country is significant, but with the "wrong" sign; so in roughly 17% of the sample of partitioned
groups, we obtain the counter-intuitive pattern of within-ethnicity development being higher
in the country with the relatively worse national institutions. For example, in the homeland of
the Anyi in Ivory Coast (rule of law index −1.25) 60% of populated pixels (132) are lit, while
in the more institutionally advanced Ghana (rule of law index −0.23), only 30% of all (89)
populated pixels are lit (see Figure 2c).15
Overall, the uncovered heterogeneity provides a useful reminder that extrapolating from
the findings of an analysis that focuses on a single border discontinuity can be quite misleading.
At the same time it raises the question about the determinants of the observed variation.
6 Penetration of National Institutions
In this section we link the heterogeneous relationship between national institutions and subna-
tional development with the limited reach of African governments in areas far from the capital.
First, we discuss the argument of the African historiography on the limited presence of the
colonial and national governments in the hinterland. Second, we estimate the baseline em-
pirical model (equation (2)) linking national institutions to development separately for pixels
close to and far from the respective capitals. Third, we explore the interaction between cap-
ital distance and national institutions in shaping regional development for all African ethnic
homelands. Fourth, we test the conjecture regarding the limited reach of the state in remote
areas using direct proxies of law enforcement at the regional level.
6.1 The Argument
Europeans’ presence in Africa was (with some exceptions) limited to the coastline and the
capital cities (see Herbst (2000) for a summary). Hence, colonial institutional arrangements,
reflected through persistence on today’s national institutions, would have limited reach far
from the capital cities. Similarly, several African scholars have argued that due to the lack
of infrastructure (roads, transportation systems) and the unfavorable geography (desert areas,
rugged terrains, rainforests), colonial and post-colonial institutions have minimal impact on the
hinterland (Mamdani (1996)). Herbst (2000), for example, reproduces a quote of a senior official
15One possible interpretation for this finding may be related to the observation that law enforcement declines
further from the capital city (see Section 6 below). This implies that in order to benefit from well-functioning
institutions economic activity may relocate closer to the capital producing, in some instances the counter-intuitive
negative relationship between national institutions and economic development at the border.
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in Central African Republic saying that "the State stops at PK 12, twelve kilometers from the
capital, Bangui." In his influential work Bates (1983) argues that African national leaders did
not even try to extend state’s power in the countryside, focusing instead on consolidating power
in the capital and the few large urban centers.
Moreover, the Scramble for Africa resulted in many countries having peculiar shapes,
further inhibiting the presence of national governments in remote areas (Herbst (2000), Engle-
bert (2009)). For example, the Casamance region in Southern Senegal (where the partitioned
Diola-Jola reside) is isolated from Dakar, as Gambia effectively cuts Senegal into two parts.
Likewise, the rainforest of Central Africa limits the presence of the government of the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo in the Eastern provinces of North and South Kivu, located hundreds
of miles away from Kinshasa. The latter are quite often ruled by local militias and rebel groups.
Furthermore, Europeans mostly ruled from the capitals that were located close to the
coast, as colonizers had little interest in settling the hinterland that was controlled with the
assistance of local chiefs. Herbst (2000; pp. 16) notes that "rather systematically, Europeans
created capitals that moved power toward the ocean and away from the interior centers of power
that Africans had slowly created". He lists many examples where colonizers decided to ignore
local needs and established capital cities outside preexisting polities. As extreme examples he
lists Mauritania and Bechuanaland (Botswana) that were ruled during colonization by capitals
outside their nominal territories (Saint-Louis and Mafeking, respectively).16
6.2 National Institutions and Proximity to the Capital. Evidence from Par-
titioned Ethnicities
Baseline Estimates The key hypothesis that emerges from this narrative is that colo-
nial and contemporary national institutions are less likely to be influential in areas far from the
capital centers. Yet in the vicinity of the latter, national institutions are likely to be important.
In this section we formally explore this conjecture. In Table 8 in odd-numbered columns we
estimate the baseline ethnicity-fixed-effects specification for pixels of split groups that are close
to the capitals; in even-numbered columns we examine the within-ethnicity association between
national institutions and development across pixels that are far from the capital city.
Panel A reports results using all pixels, while Panel B gives local linear regression es-
timates restricting estimation to pixels within 50 kilometers from each side of the border. In
columns (1)-(4) we use as a cutoff the median distance to the capital across all pixels (367.4
kilometers). The estimates on the rule of law and the control of corruption measures in columns
(1) and (3) are positive (0.07 and 0.12), considerably larger than the baseline estimates in the
16Moving the location of the capital was a key question for African leaders at independence. Yet with a few
exceptions (Tanzania, Malawi, and Nigeria), most countries did not relocate them.
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full sample of split ethnicities (where the estimate was around 0.03 for both measures; see
table 4). The coefficient on the control of corruption index is significant at standard confidence
levels, while the estimate on the rule of law index is weakly insignificant (p-value 0.15). In
contrast, when we focus on pixels that are far from the respective capital city on both sides
of the national border, the coefficients on the rule of law and the control of corruption index
in columns (2) and (4) become much smaller (0.02 - 0.03); both estimates are statistically
indistinguishable from zero.
In columns (5)-(8) we use the median relative distance to the capital within each country
to distinguish between pixels that are relatively close and relatively far from the capital.17 The
estimates in columns (5) and (7) on the two proxies of national institutions are positive (0.105
and 0.146) and statistically significant, suggesting that better functioning national institutions
translate into a higher development within partitioned ethnic homelands, but only when we
look at pixels that are relatively close to the respective capital cities. In contrast, the small
(0.01 − 0.02) and statistically insignificant estimates on national institutions in columns (6)
and (8) suggest that within partitioned groups for pixels that are relatively far from the capital
on both sides of the border there seems to be no association between institutional quality and
subnational development. The coefficient in column (7) implies that for pixels of partitioned
ethnic homelands that are relatively close to the respective capitals, a one-standard-deviation
increase in the control of corruption index (approximately 0.5) increases the probability that
a pixel is lit by approximately 7% (more than half of the average likelihood that a pixel is lit;
see Table 1).
A couple of examples help to illustrate these results. Both partitions of the Fon, a group
split between Benin and Togo, are close to the corresponding capitals (on average pixels are
100 kilometers away from Porto-Novo and Lome, respectively). Luminosity in the Fon-land
in Benin, where the rule of law index equals −0.43, is on average 53.8%, while luminosity
is 24% in the less institutionally developed Togo, where the rule of law index equals −0.94.
Another example is the Chaga, split by the Tanzanian-Kenyan border; all pixels in both sides
of the border are close to Nairobi and Dodoma. 37.5% of populated pixels of the Chaga in
Tanzania are lit (rule of law index equals −0.45) while luminosity at the Kenyan side of the
border is significantly lower with only 22.8% of pixels being lit (rule of law index in Kenya is
−1.02). Another interesting case is the Ronga, a Shona group split between Mozambique (rule
17To derive the relative distance within-country we divide pixel-level capital distance by the maximum distance
to the capital in each country. This standardization is motivated by the fact that African states are of different
land mass (ranging from small ones like Burundi and Benin to very large ones, such as Sudan, Angola, and the
Democratic Republic of Congo). Another benefit of using relative (as compared to absolute) distance is that we
mitigate concerns that our estimates are driven by large countries which naturally have larger values in absolute
capital distance.
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of law equals −0.745) and South Africa (rule of law index equals 0.156). Ronga’s homeland
in Mozambique’s has 41.5% of its pixels lit. Incidentally the capital Maputo falls within its
boundaries hence all pixels are classified as close. Yet, in the more institutionally advanced
South Africa 64% of the pixels in the Ronga partition that are close to Pretoria are lit.
It is instructive to put the magnitudes of the coefficients in perspective and obtain a
welfare assessment in terms of the affected population. Across African countries (as of 2000)
there were roughly 200 million people that reside in the homelands of partitioned ethnicities.
Of those 200 million individuals, 45% live relatively far from the respective capitals with the
remaining 55% reside relatively close to the capitals, where national institutions seem to have
a bearing on regional economic performance.
RD Visualization Figures 7a− 7b provide a graphical illustration of the differential
association between national institutions and regional development within partitioned groups
for pixels that are relatively close (on both sides of the border) and pixels that are relatively
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Distance to the National Border
Positive  Values: 5km Bins in the High Rule of Law Countries
Negative Values: 5km Bins in the Low Rule of Law Countries
Third Order Polynomial Separately Fitted on each Side
National Institutions and Light Density in 2007-2008
Dots represent local averages of 5km Bins; All Bins Far from the Capital
Figure 7b
The Figures plot the average likelihood that pixels within 5 kilometer bins are lit, conditional on
log population density and log land area; the Figures also plot predicted luminosity using cubic
RD polynomials on distance to the border. When we focus on pixels of partitioned ethnicities
that are relatively close to the respective capitals on both sides of the border (Figure 7a),
pixel-level luminosity at the side of the border with the better-functioning national institutions
is significantly higher. In contrast, when we zoom in on pixels that are relatively far from the
respective capital cities (Figure 7b), there are no differences in luminosity, in spite of differences
in national institutions.
Robustness In the Supplementary Appendix (in Section 5) we report several sen-
sitivity checks showing that regional development is significantly higher in the part of split
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homelands falling in the country with better functioning institutions, but only for pixels that
are (relatively) close the capital. Specifically, this pattern obtains when: (1) we use informa-
tion from all split groups by pooling all pixels (40, 209 observations) and interact the national
institutions measures (as well as all controls) with a dummy variable indicating pixels that are
close (or relatively close) to the respective capital; (2) we drop iteratively each of the five main
African regions; (3) we proxy national institutions with the alternative composite measures
of World Bank’s Governance Database; (4) following Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) we proxy
"property rights" institutions with Polity’s Project executive constraints measure or we proxy
"contractual" institutions with the legal formalism indicators of Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, and Shleifer (2003); and (5) we use proxies of "early" political institutions (at African
independence).
6.3 Evidence from All Groups
In principle, the conjecture of the African historiography that the role of national institutions
dissipates as one moves further from the capital regards the universe of ethnic homelands. In
Table 9 we augment the baseline model (equation (2)) with the (absolute or relative) distance
of each pixel to the capital city and an interaction term between distance to the capital and
national institutions.
In columns (1) and (4) we report cross-sectional specifications. Due to omitted variables,
reverse causation, and other forms of endogeneity, these specifications do not identify casual
relationships; yet these models are useful to quantify the correlation between institutional and
economic development at the capital ; the estimate in column (4) suggests that a one-point-
increase in the rule of law index increases the likelihood that a pixel at the capital city is lit
by approximately 18%; for comparability the analogous cross-sectional estimate in table 3 was
approximately half, 0.095. Moreover, the negative and significant coefficients on both absolute
and relative distance to the capital indicate that subnational development declines as one moves
further from the capital. Yet the most interesting finding is the significantly negative coefficient
on the interaction term between distance to the capital and rule of law; this implies that the
correlation between national institutions and regional development declines for regions further
from the capital centers.
In columns (2) and (5) we include a vector of country-specific constants as this allows us
to account for time-invariant country-level characteristics. The coefficient on distance to the
capital and most importantly the coefficient on the interaction term between distance to the
capital and the rule of law index remain significant at conventional levels.
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Figure 8a Figure 8b
Column (3) and (6) report our preferred country-ethnicity fixed effect specifications;
estimating these quite restrictive models -that include a vector of 1209 ethnic constants- is
feasible as proximity to the capital changes not only across but also within ethnic homelands.
As in our baseline estimates in the sample of partitioned ethnic groups (in Tables 4 − 8),
by exploiting solely within ethnic homeland variation, we account for ethnic-specific features,
related to either geography or culture; moreover the inclusion of ethnicity fixed effects also
account for any relation between pre-colonial ethnic features and the location of the capital by
colonizers.18 The coefficient on the interaction term between national institutions and regional
development continues to enter with a negative sign; moreover, the coefficient is statistically
significant at standard confidence levels. Thus, the within-ethnicity results in the full sample
of African ethnic homelands are quite similar to the pattern obtained within split ethnicities
(shown in Table 8). The statistically negative estimate on the interaction in columns (3) and
(6) implies that the decaying role of countrywide institutional structures far from the capitals
is a general phenomenon and not an artefact of country-specific and more importantly ethnic-
specific differences within countries. Figures 8a − b provide a graphical illustration of how
(relative) distance to the capital mediates the within-ethnicity correlation between rule of law
and subnational development in the African continent.19
6.4 The Reach of the Law beyond the Capital Cities
The pattern uncovered in Tables 8 − 9 points out that the influence of national institutions
on subnational development diminishes in areas further from the capital cities. These findings
are consistent with the view of the African historiography that both the colonial and the
national state is becoming increasingly absent in remote areas with a concomitant decline in
law enforcement. In an attempt to provide direct evidence of the differential state presence in
areas far and close to the capital, we used individual-level data from the third round of the
Afrobarometer Surveys, conducted in 2005 across a representative sample of either 1, 200 or
18Most African capitals were imposed by the colonial powers with little worry on the post-independence needs
of African states (Herbst (2000)). Nevertheless, it is plausible that colonizers or early state-builders may have
decided on the location of the capital taking into account pre-existing differences across ethnic groups, placing,
for example, the capital closer to groups that cooperated or were more developed. The inclusion of ethnicity
fixed-effects, thus, also accounts for this potentiality.
19Our finding that the positive correlation between national institutions and regional development weakens as
one moves further from the capital cities is also related to the literature on optimal country size (Alesina and
Spolaore (2003)) and recent works studying the implications of the location of the capitals on institutional and
economic development (Campante and Do (2013) and Campante, Do, and Guimaraes (2013)).
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2, 400 respondents in 17 Sub-Saharan countries.20
The Afrobarometer Surveys include two questions closely related to law enforcement.
The first question regards law enforcement of a serious crime and reads: “How likely do you
think it would be that the authorities could enforce the law if a person like you committed a
serious crime?" The second question regards tax evasion and reads: “How likely do you think
it would be that the authorities could enforce the law if a person like you did not pay a tax
on some of the income you earned?” Both measures range from 1 to 4, with higher scores
indicating that law enforcement is more likely.
To examine whether perceived law enforcement decays in remote areas, we regressed these
two proxies on (absolute and relative) distance to the capital. In columns (1)-(8) in Table 10 we
report the results. In all specifications we exploit within-country variation including a vector
of country fixed effects. Odd-numbered columns report unconditional estimates, while in even-
numbered columns we include a rich set of individual controls.21 The coefficient on absolute
distance to the capital (in (1), (2), (5), and (6)) is negative and significant, suggesting that the
likelihood of law enforcement declines for respondents residing further from the capital city.
The same pattern applies when we use relative distance to the capital (in columns (3), (4),
(7), and (8)). Individuals located in enumeration areas (villages/towns/cities) relatively further
from the respective capitals answer that it is less likely for the law to be enforced. These results
clearly indicate a declining presence of authorities in the hinterland.
The specifications reported in columns (9)-(12) provide auxiliary evidence on the declin-
ing presence of the state in areas far from the capital using survey data on individual’s self-
identification. In these linear probability models the dependent variable is a dummy equal
to one if the respondent identifies either exclusively or predominantly with the nation rather
than his/her ethnic group. Across all specifications both absolute and relative distance enter
negatively implying that in areas far from the capital people are more likely to identify with
their ethnicity, as compared to the state.22
It should be acknowledged that systematic measurement error in the institutional quality
proxies may also explain the weakening correlation between rule of law and regional develop-
ment in areas far from the capital. Since most institutional variables are measured in the
20These countries are: Benin, Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique,
Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The question on national
versus ethnic identification was not asked in Zimbabwe. The 3rd round of the Afrobarometer Surveys were also
conducted in Cape Verde; yet we do not have answers to these questions.
21Following Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) in even numbered columns we control for the respondent’s age and
age squared, a gender indicator, a dummy variable for urban households, 22 religion fixed effects, 25 occupational
fixed effects, 5 living conditions fixed effects, and 9 education constants.
22 In Supplementary Appendix 23 we show that a similar pattern emerges when we use as outcomes an index
capturing how easy it is to obtain identity documents or basic household services (like electrification, piped
water, and sewage system) from the government.
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capital cities capturing the rules governing activities of the formal economy, they might not
reflect accurately the institutional features in rural areas (Pande and Udry (2006)). Yet the
evidence uncovered in Table 10 clearly indicates that law enforcement and state presence more
generally decline with distance to the capital centers.
7 Conclusion
We study the role of national institutions in shaping regional development captured by satel-
lite images on light density at night by employing a novel approach that accounts both for
(un)observed geographical-ecological features and ethnic-specific (cultural, historical) factors.
We take advantage of the fact that the arbitrarily drawn colonial borders that endured af-
ter African independence partitioned several ethnic groups in different countries, subjecting
identical cultures residing in geographically homogeneous territories to different country-level
institutions.
We present four sets of results. First, our analysis documents that -in contrast to pre-
vious cross-sectional works- differences in economic performance within ethnicities partitioned
between neighboring countries cannot be explained by differences in national institutions. The
lack of within-ethnicity association between formal institutions and subnational development
casts doubt on the causal interpretation of the cross-sectional strong correlation, for Africa at
least. This finding, nevertheless, is in line with studies of the African historiography that down-
plays the role of national institutional structures stressing instead the key role of ethnic-specific
traits, related to the role of chiefs, culture, and pre-colonial organization (see Michalopoulos and
Papaioannou (2013b) for a literature review). Moreover, our results are in accord with a grow-
ing body of research that emphasizes the persistent effect of geographical features, cultural and
ethnic norms, epidemiological traits as well as history on long-run comparative development
(see Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013) and Nunn (2013) for reviews).
Second, we move beyond average effects by examining the association between national
institutions and regional development for each partitioned group in Africa. The analysis reveals
considerable heterogeneity. Third, in an effort to shed light on the factors shaping heterogeneity
and motivated by studies in the African historiography that emphasize the inability of many
African governments to broadcast power outside the capitals (Herbst (2000)), we find that un-
like split groups in the hinterland, differences in national institutions map into within-ethnicity
differences in luminosity for those located close to the respective capitals. This phenomenon
is not specific to split groups. In fact, it reflects a generalized pattern. Looking at the uni-
verse of African groups reveals that the explanatory power of national institutions monotoni-
cally declines with distance to the capital city. Fourth, we use individual-level data from the
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Afrobarometer Surveys and show that law enforcement decays with distance to the capital.
Moreover, ethnic (as opposed to national) identification becomes stronger for individuals in the
hinterland.
These correlations vividly illustrate the limited penetration of the state in remote ar-
eas, suggesting -that at least within Africa- treating countries as homogeneous entities where
nationwide characteristics, in our case the quality of national institutions, exert a uniform in-
fluence across regions may be quite misleading. In fact, the uncovered patterns are supportive
to an old idea among development scholars (e.g., Lewis (1954)) on the coexistence in Africa
(and other parts of the developing world) of a "dual" economic-institutional framework with
customary rules being dominant in the countryside and colonial-national institutions becoming
relevant for regions closer to the capitals (see also Herbst (2000)).
Our paper calls for future research. One could employ our methodology that compares
well-being in border areas using high resolution proxies of development (such as satellite light
density) to shed light on the debate regarding the determinants (correlates) of comparative
economic development; examining, for example, the effect of financial development, public
policies, foreign aid, fragmentation, etc. Moreover, subsequent works could build on our analysis
regarding the declining role of national institutions in areas far from the capital and explore the
impact of other geographic, cultural, national or ethnic-specific features that may attenuate or
strengthen the importance of national policies in promoting subnational development. Finally,
our evidence suggests that research on the role of institutions on development should move
beyond average effects and examine the delicate interplay between formal institutions, state
capacity, and ethnic traits.
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8 Data Appendix
Light Density at Night: Light Density is calculated averaging light density observations
across pixels that fall within the unit of analysis. We use the average of the values in 2007 and
2008. In the regressions at the ethnic homeland we use Log (0.01 + Average Luminosity). In
the Supplementary Appendix we also use the level of luminosity as the dependent variable. In
the regressions at the pixel level we use as the dependent variable a dummy variable that takes
on the value of one if the area is lit and zero otherwise.
Source: Available at http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/dmsp/global_composites_v2.html.
Population Density: Log (population density per sq. km. in 2000). Source: Nelson,
Andy, 2004. African Population Database Documentation, UNEP GRID Sioux Falls. Available
at: http://na.unep.net/siouxfalls/datasets/datalist.php
Area: Log (land area) at the country-ethnic homeland level or at the pixel level. Please
note that while most pixels are of the same surface area (2.5x2.5 degrees), pixels intersected
by the coastline, borders, and lakes are smaller.
Water Area: In the regressions at the country-ethnicity level we use the Log (1 +
total area covered by rivers or lakes in sq. km.). In the regressions at the pixel level we use
a dummy variable that takes on the value of one when some water body (river, lake, or other
stream) falls in each pixel and zero otherwise. Source: Constructed using the "Inland water
area features" dataset from Global Mapping International, Colorado Springs, CO, USA. Global
Ministry Mapping System.
Elevation: Average elevation in km of each ethnicity-country or each pixel. Source:
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and U.S. National Geophysical
Data Center, TerrainBase, release 1.0 (CD-ROM), Boulder, Colorado.
http://www.sage.wisc.edu/atlas/data.php?incdataset=Topography
Land Suitability for Agriculture: Average land quality for cultivation within each
country-ethnicity homeland or within each pixel. The index is the product of two components
capturing the climatic and soil suitability for farming. Source: Michalopoulos (2012); Original
Source: Atlas of the Biosphere.
Available at http://www.sage.wisc.edu/iamdata/grid_data_sel.php.
Malaria Stability Index: Average prevalence of malaria within each ethnicity-country
or within each pixel. The index takes into account the prevalence and type of mosquitoes
indigenous to a region, their human biting rate, their daily survival rate, and their incubation
period. Source: Kiszewski, Mellinger, Spielman, Malaney, Sachs, and Sachs (2004)
Distance to the Capital City: The geodesic distance from the centroid of each
ethnicity-country/pixel to the capital city of the country it belongs to, measured in 1000s
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of km’s. Source: Calculated using the Haversine formula.
Relative Distance to the Capital City: Distance to the Capital City divided by the
maximum distance to the capital in the same country.
Distance to the Sea Coast: The geodesic distance to the nearest coastline from the
centroid of each ethnicity-country/pixel, measured in 1000s of km’s. Source: Global Map-
ping International, Colorado Springs, Colorado, USA. Series name: Global Ministry Mapping
System. Series issue: Version 3.0
Distance to the National Border: The geodesic distance to the nearest national
border from the centroid of each ethnicity-country/pixel, measured in 1000s of km’s. Source:
Calculated using ArcGis.
Petroleum: Indicator variable that equals one if an oil field is found in the region (or
pixel) of ethnic group i in country c. Source: The Petroleum Dataset v.1.1 contains information
on all known on-shore oil and gas deposits throughout the world.
http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Geographical-and-Resource/Petroleum-Dataset/Petroleum-
Dataset-v11/
Diamond: Indicator variable that takes on the value of one if a diamond mine is found
in the region (or pixel) of ethnic group i in country c. Source: Map of Diamond Resources.
www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Geographical-and-Resource/Diamond-Resources/
Rule of Law: The index is "capturing perceptions of the extent to which agents have
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract en-
forcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and
violence." The standardized index ranges from −2.5 to +2.5 with higher values indicating bet-
ter functioning institutions. We use the average value over the period 1996 − 2006. In the
regression discontinuity (RD) analysis we also define a dummy (indicator) variable that takes
on the value one pixels falling in the country with the higher level of the rule of law index.
Source: World Bank Governance Matters Indicators Database (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mas-
truzzi (2008)). available at:
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp.
Control of Corruption: Index on the control of corruption "capturing perceptions
of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and
grand forms of corruption, as well as capture of the state by elites and private interests." The
standardized index ranges from −2.5 to +2.5 with lower values indicating a higher degree of
corruption. We use the average value over the period 1996−2006. In the regression discontinuity
(RD) analysis we also define a dummy (indicator) variable that takes on the value one for pixels
falling in the country with the higher level of the control of corruption index. Source: World
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Bank Governance Matters Indicators Database (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2008)).
available at:
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp.
Law Enforcement 1: Ordered (range 1 − 4) variable capturing law enforcement re-
garding committing a serious crime based on individuals’ responses to the following question:
"How likely do you think it would be that the authorities could enforce the law if a person
like you committed a serious crime?" A score of 1 indicates "not at all likely"; a score of 2
suggests "not very likely"; a score of 3 indicates "likely"; and a score of 4 indicates "very
likely". Source: Afrobarometer Surveys. 3rd Round. Question Number: Q70B. available at:
http://www.afrobarometer.org/data/round-3-merged
Law Enforcement 2: Ordered (range 1 − 4) variable capturing law enforcement re-
garding tax evasion based on individuals’ responses to the following question: "How likely do
you think it would be that the authorities could enforce the law if a person like you did not pay
a tax on some of the income you earned?" A score of 1 indicates "not at all likely"; a score
of 2 suggests "not very likely"; a score of 3 indicates "likely"; and a score of 4 indicates "very
likely". Source: Afrobarometer Surveys. 3rd Round. Question Number: Q70D. available at:
http://www.afrobarometer.org/data/round-3-merged
National Identification: Dummy variable that takes on the value of one if the re-
spondent replies that he or she identifies more strongly with the nation rather than his/her
ethnicity. The question reads: "Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a [Ghana-
ian/Kenyan/etc.] and being a _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ [respondent’s identity group]. Which of these
two groups do you feel most strongly attached to?" The variable equals one if the respondent
replies that he identifies solely or predominantly with his nation and zero otherwise. Source:
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variable Obs. mean st. dev. p25 median p75 min max
Light Density 507 0.228 0.768 0.000 0.015 0.095 0.000 8.561
Ln (0.01 + Light Density) 507 -3.168 1.586 -4.605 -3.696 -2.258 -4.605 2.148
Ln (0.01 + Population Density) 507 2.650 1.929 1.647 2.936 3.945 -5.069 6.386
Ln (1 + Water Area) 507 0.242 0.407 0.000 0.075 0.264 0.000 2.464
Ln (Area) 507 1.876 1.490 0.798 1.906 2.963 -2.170 5.665
Mean Elevation 507 0.605 0.434 0.281 0.469 0.938 0.000 2.181
Land Suitability For Agriculture 507 0.415 0.224 0.273 0.439 0.573 0.002 0.959
Malaria Stability Index 507 0.747 0.323 0.548 0.905 1.000 0.000 1.000
Oil Deposit Indicator 507 0.063 0.243 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Diamond Mine Indicator 507 0.101 0.301 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Distance to the Capital City 507 0.524 0.371 0.280 0.429 0.685 0.013 1.882
Distance to the Sea Coast 507 0.591 0.425 0.225 0.552 0.931 0.000 1.739
Distance to the Border 507 0.039 0.039 0.012 0.029 0.052 0.000 0.250
Rule of Law 507 -0.914 0.573 -1.355 -1.021 -0.543 -2.198 0.615
Control of Corruption 507 -0.797 0.501 -1.091 -0.864 -0.651 -1.664 0.814
Light Density 42710 0.312 2.335 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 62.857
Ln (0.01 + Light Density) 42710 -4.111 1.465 -4.605 -4.605 -4.605 -4.605 4.141
Light Density 0-1 42710 0.124 0.329 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Ln (0.01 + Population Density) 42710 2.074 1.771 0.734 2.143 3.328 -5.094 9.121
Water Area Indicator 42710 0.129 0.335 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Ln (Area) 42710 4.885 0.650 4.857 5.211 5.243 2.303 5.259
Mean Elevation 42566 641.612 470.408 292.111 526.048 969.556 -406.000 4623.750
Land Suitability For Agriculture 41149 0.341 0.259 0.103 0.325 0.511 0.001 0.999
Malaria Stability Index 42710 0.710 0.395 0.365 0.989 1.000 0.000 1.000
Oil Deposit Indicator 42710 0.018 0.135 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Diamond Mine Indicator 42710 0.004 0.062 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Distance to the Capital City 42710 0.532 0.369 0.271 0.439 0.707 0.001 1.933
Distance to the Sea Coast 42710 581.363 414.433 233.430 507.473 896.488 0.286 1735.680
Distance to the Border 42710 65.938 68.091 15.754 44.255 93.799 0.000 448.539
Rule of Law 42710 -0.909 0.606 -1.355 -0.820 -0.506 -2.198 0.615
Control of Corruption 42710 -0.779 0.534 -1.141 -0.864 -0.651 -1.664 0.814
The table reports descriptive statistics for all variables employed in the empirical analysis for the sample of partitioned ethnic 
homelands in Africa. Panel A reports summary statistics at the country-ethnicity level. Panel B reports summary statistics at the pixel 
level. The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Panel A: Partitioned Ethnic Homelands Sample
























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Rule of Law -0.0474 0.0480 0.0041 0.0091 -0.015 0.0365* -0.0161 -0.1887 0.0001 -0.0037
  Double-clustered s.e.  (0.2058)  (0.0453)  (0.0217)  (0.0184)  (0.0230)  (0.0199)  (0.0433)  (0.1233)  (0.0178)  (0.0049)
Adjusted R-squared 0.682 0.796 0.964 0.935 0.941 0.753 0.547 0.582 0.986 0.639
Observations 507 507 507 507 507 507 507 507 507 507
Control of Corruption -0.0686 0.037 0.0119 -0.0052 -0.0324 0.0431 -0.0199 -0.1753 0.0037 -0.007
  Double-clustered s.e.  (0.2229)  (0.0610)  (0.0222)  (0.0243)  (0.0233)  (0.0294)  (0.0612)  (0.1490)  (0.0176)  (0.0077)
Adjusted R-squared 0.683 0.795 0.964 0.935 0.941 0.753 0.547 0.565 0.986 0.551
Observations 507 507 507 507 507 507 507 507 507 507
High Rule of Law 0.0696 0.0475 -0.0013 0.0129 -0.0103 0.0409 -0.0273 -0.1584 0.0036 0.0031
  Double-clustered s.e.  (0.1111)  (0.0346)  (0.0171)  (0.0132)  (0.0195)  (0.0271)  (0.0414)  (0.1029)  (0.0111)  (0.0049)
Adjusted R-squared 0.818 0.866 0.972 0.952 0.953 0.804 0.629 0.612 0.991 0.639
Observations 440 440 440 440 440 440 440 440 440
High Control of Corruption 0.0262 0.0547 -0.0074 0.0105 -0.0025 0.0318 -0.0091 -0.0304 -0.0032 -0.0002
  Double-clustered s.e.  (0.1259)  (0.0351)  (0.0185)  (0.0160)  (0.0217)  (0.0262)  (0.0455)  (0.1182)  (0.0103)  (0.0058)
Adjusted R-squared 0.817 0.867 0.972 0.952 0.953 0.802 0.627 0.569 0.991 0.638
Observations 440 440 440 440 440 440 440 440 440 440
Ethnicities 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220
Ethnicity Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dependent Variable is:
Table 2: Validity of Identification Design at the Country-Ethnicity Homeland Level
Panel B: Control of Corruption
Panel C: High Control for Corruption - Two Major Partitioned Ethnic Areas
Panel A: Rule of Law
Panel C: High Rule of Law - Two Major Partitioned Ethnic Areas
The table reports within-ethnicity OLS estimates associating various geographical, ecological, and other characteristics with contemporary national institutions, as reflected in 
World Bank’s Governance Matters rule of law index (in Panel A) and control of corruption index (in Panel B) in areas of partitioned ethnicities. In Panels C and D we focus on 
the two major partitions of an ethnic group (in total 440 ethnic areas of 220 partitioned ethnicities). The high institutional quality indicator takes on the value one for the areas 
falling in the country with the higher value in the rule of law index (in Panel C) or in the control for corruption index (in Panel D).
The dependent variable in column (1) is the log (land area); in column (2) is the log (1 + land area under water (lakes, rivers, and other streams)); in column (3) is mean 
elevation; in column (4) is an index of land suitability for agriculture; in column (5) is the average of a malaria stability index; in column (6) is an indicator for country-ethnic 
areas with an oil field; in column (7) is an indicator for country-ethnic areas with a diamond mine. In columns (8)-(10) the dependent variable is the distance of the centroid of 
each country-ethnic area from the capital city, the sea coast, and the national border, respectively. The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources. Below 
the estimates we report in parentheses double-clustered standard errors at the country and the ethno-linguistic family dimensions. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Institutional Quality 0.8229*** 0.8017*** 0.7646*** 0.6513*** 1.0328*** 1.0351*** 0.9945*** 0.8218***
  Double-clustered s.e.  (0.2839)  (0.2451)  (0.2507)  (0.1962)  (0.3421)  (0.2517)  (0.2334)  (0.2158)
Adjusted R-squared 0.080 0.314 0.379 0.468 0.0950 0.3340 0.3950 0.475
Observations 1209 1209 1209 1209 1209 1209 1209 1209
Institutional Quality 0.1248*** 0.1199*** 0.0988*** 0.0765** 0.1470*** 0.1467*** 0.1223*** 0.0968** 
  Double-clustered s.e.  (0.0443)  (0.0415)  (0.0380)  (0.0334)  (0.0478)  (0.0431)  (0.0404)  (0.0409)
Adjusted R-squared 0.049 0.175 0.192 0.256 0.056 0.185 0.198 0.260
Observations 120501 120501 120501 116412 120501 120501 120501 116412
Pop. Dens. & Area No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Location Controls No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Geographic Controls No No No Yes No No No Yes
Table 3 - Cross-Sectional Analysis
National Institutions and Regional Development 
Panel B: Pixel Level
The table reports OLS estimates associating regional development with contemporary national institutions, as reflected in World 
Bank’s Governance Matters rule of law index (in columns (1)-(4)) and control of corruption index (in columns (5)-(8)) at the 
country-ethnicity level (in Panel A) and at the pixel level (in Panel B). In Panel A the dependent variable is log (0.01 + light 
density at night from satellite) at the ethnicity-country level. In Panel B the dependent variable is an indicator that takes on the 
value of one if the pixel (of 0.125 x 0.125 decimal degrees) is lit and zero otherwise. 
In the specifications in columns (2)-(4) and (6)-(8) we control for log (population density in 2000) and log land area at the country-
ethnicity level (in Panel A) or at the pixel-level (in Panel B). In columns (3), (4), (7), and (8) we control for location 
characteristics augmenting the specification with distance of the centroid of each ethnicity-country area or each pixel from the 
capital city of each country, distance from the closest sea coast, and distance from the national border. The set of geographic 
controls in columns (4) and (8) includes log (1 + area under water (lakes, rivers, and other streams)) for the models in Panel A and 
an indicator that takes on the value one if there is some water body in the pixel for the models in Panel B, land suitability for 
agriculture, elevation, a malaria stability index, a diamond mine indicator, and an oil field indicator. The Data Appendix gives 
detailed variable definitions and data sources. Below the estimates we report in parentheses double-clustered standard errors at the 
country and at the ethno-linguistic family dimensions. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively.
Rule of Law
Panel A: Country-Ethnic Homeland Level
Control of Corruption
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Institutional Quality 0.6510*** 0.1943 0.5150** 0.2159 0.7904*** 0.2566 0.6019*** 0.2675
  Double-clustered s.e.  (0.1951)  (0.1898)  (0.2024)  (0.2135)  (0.2268)  (0.2197)  (0.2329)  (0.2439)
Adjusted R-squared 0.292 0.792 0.392 0.798 0.298 0.792 0.393 0.798
Within R-squared __ 0.061 __ 0.067 __ 0.062 __ 0.067
Observations 507 507 507 507 507 507 507 507
Institutional Quality 0.1072*** 0.0246 0.0834** 0.0278 0.1371*** 0.0370 0.1097*** 0.0403
  Double-clustered s.e.  (0.0400)  (0.0165) (0.0324) (0.0181)  (0.0464)  (0.0273) (0.0415) (0.0290)
Adjusted R-squared 0.149 0.331 0.202 0.340 0.160 0.331 0.209 0.340
Within R-squared __ 0.059 __ 0.066 __ 0.059 __ 0.066
Observations 42710 42710 41025 41025 42710 42710 41025 41025
Ethnicity Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Pop. Dens. & Area Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Controls No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Geographic Controls No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
The table reports cross-sectional and within-ethnicity OLS estimates associating regional development with contemporary national 
institutions, as reflected in World Bank’s Governance Matters rule of law index (in columns (1)-(4)) and control of corruption index 
(in columns (5)-(8)) in areas of partitioned ethnicities at the country-ethnicity level (in Panel A) and at the pixel level (in Panel B). 
In Panel A the dependent variable is log (0.01 + light density at night from satellite) at the ethnicity-country level. In Panel B the 
dependent variable is an indicator that takes on the value of one if the pixel (of 0.125 x 0.125 decimal degrees) is lit and zero 
otherwise. Odd-numbered columns report cross-sectional specifications. Even-numbered columns report within-ethnicity estimates, 
where we include a vector of ethnicity fixed effects (constants not reported). 
In all specifications we control for log (population density in 2000) and log land area at the country-ethnicity level (in Panel A) or at 
the pixel level (in Panel B). In columns (3), (4), (7), and (8) we control for location and geography, augmenting the specification 
with distance of the centroid of each ethnicity-country (in Panel A) or each pixel (in Panel B) from the capital city of each country, 
distance from the closest sea coast, and distance from the national border. The set of geographic controls includes log (1 + area 
under water (lakes, rivers, and other streams)) for the models in Panel A and an indicator that takes on the value one if there is some 
water body in the pixel for the models in Panel B, land suitability for agriculture, elevation, a malaria stability index, a diamond 
mine indicator, and an oil field indicator. Besides the adjusted R-squared, the table also reports the within R-squared (defined as the 
difference of the overall R-squared minus the overall R-squared of a model simply with ethnicity fixed effects).
The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources. Below the estimates we report in parentheses double-
clustered standard errors at the country and ethno-linguistic family dimensions. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Country-Ethnic Homeland Level
Panel B: Pixel Level
Table 4: National Institutions and Regional Development 
across and within Partitioned Ethnic Groups
Rule of Law Control of Corruption
Bandwidth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Institutional Quality 0.6788*** 0.0827 0.5975*** 0.1503 0.8585*** 0.0866 0.7458*** 0.1765
  Double-clustered s.e.  (0.2116)  (0.2318)  (0.2098)  (0.2480)  (0.2465)  (0.2602)  (0.2591)  (0.2951)
  
Adjusted R-squared 0.311 0.842 0.285 0.848 0.324 0.842 0.293 0.848
Within R-squared __ 0.027 __ 0.033 __ 0.027 __ 0.033
Observations 432 432 432 432 432 432 432 432
Institutional Quality 0.0994*** 0.0168 0.1031** 0.0159 0.1292*** 0.0269 0.1346*** 0.0197
  Double-clustered s.e. (0.0384) (0.0181) (0.0407) (0.0163) (0.0471) (0.0259)  (0.0492)  (0.0210)
Adjusted R-squared 0.134 0.319 0.137 0.345 0.144 0.319 0.149 0.345
Within R-squared __ 0.051 __ 0.046 __ 0.051 __ 0.046
Observations 21289 21289 13408 13408 21289 21289 13408 13408
Ethnicity Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Pop. Dens. & Area Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 5: National Institutions and Regional Development across and within Partitioned Ethnic Groups in 
Areas Close to the Border. Local Regressions
The table reports cross-sectional and within-ethnicity OLS estimates associating regional development with contemporary national 
institutions, as reflected in World Bank’s Governance Matters rule of law index (in columns (1)-(4)) and control of corruption index (in 
columns (5)-(8)) in areas of partitioned ethnicities at the country-ethnicity level (in Panel A) and at the pixel level (in Panel B). In Panel 
A the dependent variable is log (0.01 + light density at night from satellite) at the ethnicity-country level. In Panel B the dependent 
variable is an indicator that takes on the value of one if the pixel (of 0.125 x 0.125 decimal degrees) is lit and zero otherwise. 
In columns (1), (2), (5), and (6) we focus on ethnic areas within 50 kilometers of each side of the national border (total 100 kilometers). 
In columns (3), (4), (7), and (8) we focus on ethnic areas within 25 kilometers of each side of the national border (total 50 kilometers). 
Odd-numbered columns report cross-sectional specifications. Even-numbered columns report within-ethnicity estimates, where we 
include a vector of ethnicity fixed effects (constants not reported). In all specifications we control for log (population density in 2000) 
and log land area at the country-ethnic homeland level (in Panel A) and in the pixel-level (in Panel B). Besides the adjusted R-squared, 
the table also reports the within R-squared (defined as the difference of the overall R-squared minus the overall R-squared of a model 
simply with ethnicity fixed effects).
The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources. Below the estimates we report in parentheses double-clustered 
standard errors at the country and ethno-linguistic family dimensions. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Country-Ethnic Homeland Level
Panel B: Pixel Level
Rule of Law Control of Corruption
100 km 50 km 100 km 50 km
Bandwidth
RD Polynomial 3rd-order 4th-order 3rd-order 4th-order 3rd-order 4th-order 3rd-order 4th-order 3rd-order 4th-order 3rd-order 4th-order
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Institutional Quality 0.0166 0.0058 0.0123 0.0050 -0.0010 0.0122 0.0038 -0.0086 0.0116 0.0123 -0.0030 0.0079
  Double-clustered s.e.  (0.0138)  (0.0135)  (0.0165)  (0.0185)  (0.0240)  (0.0272)  (0.0154)  (0.0137)  (0.0166)  (0.0176)  (0.0223)  (0.0276)
Adjusted R-squared 0.342 0.342 0.320 0.320 0.347 0.347 0.342 0.343 0.320 0.320 0.347 0.347
within R-squared 0.059 0.059 0.037 0.037 0.064 0.064 0.059 0.060 0.037 0.037 0.064 0.064
Institutional Quality 0.0175 0.0203 0.0037 0.0135 0.0068 0.0185 0.0020 0.0114 0.0011 0.0094 0.0124 0.0128
  Double-clustered s.e.  (0.0125)  (0.0154)  (0.0124)  (0.0183)  (0.0176)  (0.0318)  (0.0119)  (0.0138)  (0.0136)  (0.0181)  (0.0189)  (0.0283)
Adjusted R-squared 0.416 0.427 0.412 0.423 0.441 0.459 0.416 0.427 0.412 0.423 0.441 0.459
within R-squared 0.133 0.144 0.129 0.140 0.158 0.176 0.133 0.144 0.129 0.140 0.158 0.176
Observations 40209 40209 21289 21289 13408 13408 40209 40209 21289 21289 13408 13408
Ethnicity Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pixel Area & Pop. Dens. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 6:  National Institutions and Regional Development at the Border
Regression Discontinuity (RD) Estimates
Rule of Law Control of Corruption
All Pixels 100 km 50 km All Observations
The table reports regression discontinuity (RD) estimates. Estimation is performed across the two major partitions of split ethnic group. In Panel A we include a global (common to 
all partitioned ethnicities) RD polynomial in distance of the centroid of each pixel to the national border, allowing the polynomial terms to differ on the two sides of the border. In 
Panel B we include ethnic-specific RD polynomials in distance of the centroid of each pixel to the national border, allowing the polynomial terms to differ on the two sides of the 
border. In odd-numbered columns we include a third-order RD polynomial, while in even-numbered columns we include a fourth-order RD polynomial. In columns (3)-(6) and (9)-
(12) we restrict estimation to pixels close to the national border using two different bandwidths. In columns (3), (4), (9), and (10) we focus on pixels within 50 kilometers on each 
side of the national border (total 100 kilometers). In columns (5), (6), (11), and (12) we focus on pixels within 25 kilometers of each side of the national border (total 50 
kilometers). The high institutional quality indicator takes on the value of one for pixels falling in the country with the higher value in the rule of law index (in columns (1)-(6)) or in 
the control of corruption index (in columns (7)-(12)). All specifications include ethnicity fixed effects (constants not reported), the log of pixel-level population density and the log 
of pixel surface area. Besides the adjusted R-squared, the table also reports the within R-squared (defined as the difference of the overall R-squared minus the overall R-squared of 
a model simply with ethnicity fixed effects).The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources. Below the estimates we report in parentheses double-clustered 
standard errors at the country and at the ethnolinguistic level dimensions. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
100 km 50 km
Panel A: Global Regression Discontinuity (RD) Polynomial 
Panel B: Ethnic-Specific Regression Discontinuity (RD) Polynomial 
Cutt-off
Global RD Polynomial No 3rd-order 4th-order No 3rd-order 4th-order No 3rd-order 4th-order No 3rd-order 4th-order
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Institutional Quality 0.0159 0.0116 -0.0027 0.0134 0.0049 -0.0207 0.009 0.0133 -0.003 0.041 0.0367 0.0024
 (0.0186) (0.0199) (0.0212) (0.0311) (0.0376) (0.0330) (0.0204) (0.0215) (0.0201) (0.0346) (0.0336) (0.0251)
Adjusted R-squared 0.398 0.400 0.400 0.458 0.461 0.462 0.399 0.399 0.400 0.457 0.460 0.461
within R-squared 0.072 0.074 0.075 0.075 0.078 0.080 0.064 0.065 0.065 0.078 0.080 0.082
Observations 19349 19349 19349 10031 10031 10031 19814 19814 19814 10353 10353 10353
Ethnicities 110 110 110 51 51 51 108 108 108 46 46 46
Ethnicity Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pixel Area & Pop. Dens. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
The table reports simple fixed effects as well as regression discontinuity (RD) estimates focusing on large discontinuities in national institutions across the border. Estimation is 
performed across the two major partitions of each ethnic group. In columns (2), (5), (8), and (11) we include a third-order RD polynomial on distance to the national border. In 
columns (3), (6), (9), and (12) we include a fourth-order RD polynomial on distance to the national border. In columns (1)-(3) and columns (7)-(9) we use the median value of 
differences in the rule of law index across adjacent countries to identify large discontinuities. In columns (4)-(6) and columns (10)-(12) we use the 75th percentile of differences in 
the rule of law index across adjacent countries to identify large discontinuities. The high institutional quality indicator takes on the value of one for pixels falling in the country with 
the higher value in the rule of law index (in columns (1)-(6)) or in the control of corruption index (in columns (7)-(12)). All specifications include ethnicity fixed effects (constants 
not reported), the log of pixel-level population density and the log of pixel surface area. Besides the adjusted R-squared, the table also reports the within R-squared (defined as the 
difference of the overall R-squared minus the overall R-squared of a model simply with ethnicity fixed effects).
The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources. Below the estimates we report in parentheses double-clustered standard errors at the country and at the 
ethnolinguistic level dimensions. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Table 7:  National Institutions and Regional Development at the Border
Regression Discontinuity (RD) Estimates. Large Discontinuities
median 75th percentile
Rule of Law Control of Corruption
median 75th percentile
Close Far Close Far Close Far Close Far
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Institutional Quality 0.0675 0.0206 0.1220** 0.0330 0.1064* 0.0127 0.1455** 0.0218
  Double-clustered s.e.  (0.0438)  (0.0233)  (0.0581)  (0.0258)  (0.0585)  (0.0225)  (0.0675)  (0.0237)
Adjusted R-squared 0.421 0.210 0.423 0.211 0.451 0.245 0.452 0.246
within R-squared 0.089 0.062 0.091 0.063 0.084 0.046 0.085 0.047
Observations 12546 15225 12546 15225 10612 19385 10612 19385
Number of Ethnicities 85 95 85 95 66 139 66 139
Institutional Quality 0.0450 0.0040 0.1111* 0.0153 0.1140* -0.0005 0.1564** 0.0112
  Double-clustered s.e.  (0.0618)  (0.0239)  (0.0651)  (0.0269)  (0.0641)  (0.0235)  (0.0620)  (0.0258)
Adjusted R-squared 0.407 0.195 0.410 0.196 0.445 0.225 0.447 0.225
within R-squared 0.085 0.044 0.087 0.044 0.090 0.036 0.092 0.036
Observations 6129 8120 6129 8120 4655 10987 4655 10987
Number of Ethnicities 81 94 81 94 60 137 60 137
Ethnicity Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pop. Dens. & Area Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location & Geography Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
The table reports within-ethnicity OLS estimates associating regional development with contemporary national institutions, as reflected 
in World Bank’s Governance Matters rule of law index (in columns (1), (2), (5), and (6)) and control of corruption index (in columns 
(3), (4), (7), and (8)) in areas of partitioned ethnicities. The unit of analysis is a pixel of 0.125 x 0.125 decimal degrees (around 12 x 12 
kilometers) within partitioned ethnicities. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the pixel is lit and zero 
otherwise. In odd-numbered columns we restrict estimation to pixels of partitioned ethnic areas that are close to the capital city. In even-
numbered columns we restrict estimation to pixels of partitioned ethnic areas that are far from the capital city. In columns (1)-(4) we use 
as a cut-off the median value of absolute distance to the capital across all African pixels, while in  columns (5)-(8) we use as a cut-off 
the median value of the within-country distance to the respective capital city.
In Panel A we use all pixels of partitioned ethnicities. In Panel B we report local linear regressions restricting estimation to pixels of 
partitioned ethnicities within 50 kilometers from each side of the national border (total 100 kilometers). All specifications include a 
vector of ethnicity fixed effects (constants not reported). In all specifications we control for log population density, log land area, 
distance of the centroid of each pixel from the capital city of each country (in columns (5)-(8) we use relative distance to the capital city 
of each country), distance from the closest sea coast, distance from the national border, an indicator for pixels with a water body (lakes, 
rivers, and other streams)), land suitability for agriculture, elevation, a malaria stability index, a diamond mine indicator, and an oil field 
indicator. Besides the adjusted R-squared, the table also reports the within R-squared (defined as the difference of the overall R-squared 
minus the overall R-squared of a model simply with ethnicity fixed effects). The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and 
data sources. Below the estimates we report in parentheses double-clustered standard errors at the country and ethno-linguistic family 
dimensions. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel B: Local Regressions (100km bandwidth)
Table 8 - Heterogeneity: National Institutions and Regional Development
within Partitioned Ethnicities Close and Far from the Capital Cities
Absolute Distance to the Capital Relative Distance to the Capital
Panel A: All Observations/Pixels 
Rule of Law Control of Corruption Rule of Law Control of Corruption
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rule of Law 0.1434*** __ __ 0.1790*** __ __
  Double-clustered s.e. (0.0426) (0.0472)                
               
Distance to the Capital -0.1352*** -0.2103*** -0.1097** -0.3098*** -0.2530*** -0.1457***
  Double-clustered s.e. (0.0511) (0.0404) (0.0534) (0.0846) (0.0502) (0.0499)
               
Rule of Law X -0.1243*** -0.1513*** -0.0850** -0.2297*** -0.1850*** -0.1042** 
  Distance to the Capital (0.0363) (0.0315) (0.0352) (0.0624) (0.0461) (0.0439)
Adjusted R-squared 0.261 0.362 0.429 0.267 0.362 0.429
Observations 116412 116412 116412 116412 116412 116412
Pixel Area & Pop. Dens. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects No Yes No No Yes No
Country-Ethnicity FE No No Yes No No Yes
Table 9:  National Institutions, Distance to the Capital, and Regional Development
Pixel-Level Estimates in the Full Sample
The table reports OLS estimates associating regional development with distance to the capital city and contemporary national 
institutions, as reflected in World Bank’s Governance Matters rule of law index across the full sample of country-ethnic homelands 
in Africa. The unit of analysis is pixels of 0.125 x 0.125 decimal degrees (around 12 x 12 kilometers). The dependent variable is a 
dummy variable that takes the value one if the pixel is lit and zero otherwise.  
Columns (1) and (5) give unconditional estimates. In columns (2)-(4) and (6)-(8) we control for log (population density), log land 
area, distance of the centroid of each pixel from the capital city of each country, distance from the closest sea coast, distance from 
the national border, an indicator for pixels with a water body (lakes, rivers, and other streams)), land suitability for agriculture, 
elevation, a malaria stability index, a diamond mine indicator, and an oil field indicator. The specifications in columns (3) and (7) 
include a vector of country fixed effects (constants not reported). The specifications in columns (4) and (8) include a vector of 
country-ethnicity fixed effects (constants not reported). The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources. 
Below the estimates we report in parentheses double-clustered standard errors at the country and ethno-linguistic family dimensions. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Absolute Distance to the Capital Relative Distance to the Capital
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Absolute Distance -0.1238*** -0.1027** -0.1118*** -0.1006*** -0.0850** -0.0740*                 
  Double-clustered s.e.  (0.0446)  (0.0408)  (0.0410)  (0.0386)  (0.0414)  (0.0382)                 
Relative Distance -0.0860** -0.0665* -0.0655* -0.0563* -0.0949** -0.0819** 
  Double-clustered s.e.  (0.0375)  (0.0354)  (0.0341)  (0.0326)  (0.0411)  (0.0379)
Adjusted R-squared 0.069 0.075 0.068 0.075 0.053 0.062 0.052 0.062 0.096 0.108 0.097 0.109
Observations 20466 19862 20466 19862 20842 20230 20842 20230 20125 19503 20125 19503
Individual Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
The table reports country fixed effects OLS estimates, associating legal enforcement (in columns (1)-(8)) and ethnic identification (in columns (9)-(12)) as reflected by individual 
responses in the Afrobarometer Surveys (3rd round) at the individual level with distance to the capital. 
The dependent variable is columns (1)-(4) is an ordered index (range from 1 to 4) based on individual responses on how likely it is that authorities will enforce the law if a person 
like the respondent committed a serious crime. The dependent variable is columns (5)-(8) is an ordered index (range from 1 to 4) based on individual responses on how likely it is 
that authorities will enforce the law if a person like the respondent did not pay taxes on income earned. For both measures a score of 1 indicates “not at all likely”, a score of 2 
indicates “not very likely”, a score of 3 indicates “likely” and a score of 4 indicates “very likely”.  The dependent variable in columns (9)-(12) is a dummy variable that takes on the 
value of one if the respondent replies that she identifies more strongly with her nation than the ethnicity she belongs to.  
Even-numbered columns include a rich set of individual controls. The individual-level conditioning set includes age, age squared, a gender indicator variable, an urban indicator, 22 
religion fixed effects, 25 occupation fixed effects, 5 living conditions fixed effects, and 9 education fixed effects. All specifications include a set of country fixed effects (constants 
not reported).
The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources. Below the estimates we report in parentheses double-clustered standard errors at the enumeration area and 
at the ethnicity level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Law Enforcement 1: Serious Crime Law Enforcement 2: Tax Evasion National versus Ethnic Identification
Table 10: Law Enforcement and Ethnic Identification as Function of Distance to the Capital
Afrobarometer Sample. Country-Fixed-Effects Estimates
